The aim of this paper is to investigate a vertically differentiated market served either by a multiproduct monopolist or by duopolists, in which a public authority aiming at increasing the welfare level can choose among two instruments, namely, quality taxation/subsidization, and minimum quality...

We revisit the Cournot-Bertrand debate in the light of Cournot (1863), Edgeworth (1881, 1897) and Launhardt (1885), tracing back to Launhardt the origin of price competition in duopoly models. Then, we discuss the formalization of consumer utility function for differentiated products, first...

We revisit the Cournot–Bertrand debate in the light of Cournot, Edgeworth and Launhardt, tracing back to Launhardt the origin of price competition in duopoly models with constant returns to scale. Then, we discuss the formalisation of consumer utility function for differentiated products,...

The aim of this paper is to investigate a vertically differentiated market served either by a multiproduct monopolist or by duopolists, in which a public authority aiming at increasing the welfare level can choose among two instruments, namely, quality taxation/subsidisation, and minimum quality...