We study information acquisition in a coordination game with incomplete information. To capture the idea that players can flexibly decide what information to acquire, we do not impose any physical restriction on feasible information structure. Facing an informational cost measured by reduction...

We study multi-agent security design in the presence of coordination frictions. A principal intends to develop a project whose value increases with an unknown state and the level of agents’ participation. To motivate the participation of ex-ante homogeneous agents, the principal offers them...

We study the optimality of debt through the interaction between security design and information acquisition. An impatient seller designs a security backed by her asset in place and a buyer decides whether to buy the security in order to provide liquidity. Facing different securities, the buyer...

We study a dynamic contracting problem in which the principal can allocate his limited capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or that contradicts the agent's effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. Such flexibility calls for jointly designed monitoring and compensation schemes...

We study liquidity provision by dealers in a dynamic model of asset markets. When economic fundamentals are high (low), dealers provide more (less) liquidity by holding more (less) inventory, the market is liquid (illiquid), and interdealer trading is active (inactive). When fundamentals are...