Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.

The research question of this paper is to analyse when an operator and a service provider prefer a fixed price contract, common in the oil and gas industry, versus the uncommon incentive-based contract. The contracts are modelled with 20 parameters and one free choice variable which is the time...

We develop a game theoretic model for the central banks profit and the markets profit dependent on quantitative easing (QE) or no quantitative easing (no QE), where the market responds by lowering interest rates, keeping interest rates unchanged, or raising interest rates. The model is compared...

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The article proposes an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of governmental units, giving autonomy to each individual as in a direct democracy. The mechanism is designed such that Pareto optimality is possible, in contrast to earlier models which make various...

The provision of outsourcing services creates relationships between knowledge vested with the supplier and the viability of outsourcing arrangements. Knowledge accumulation by the outsourcee can reach a level where it poses a market entry or takeover risk to the outsourcer. Knowledge translates...

Iceberg costs are modelled as a transaction cost function, which increases exponentially in an action chosen by each player. The model estimates how much the players' joint ex post shares shrink in terms of their transaction constants and production.

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The...

One defender defends, and multiple heterogeneous attackers attack, an asset. Three scenarios are considered: the agents move simultaneously; the defender moves first; or the attackers move first. We show how the agents' unit costs of defense and attack, their asset evaluations, and the number of...

The paper criticizes Axelrod's (1970) measure of conflict, which is basically a measure of the conflict of interest and does not account for the potential for overt conflictful behavior based on how the actors are strategically interpositioned. Differences between the two dimensions of conflict...