This note demonstrates that it is easily possible to compute technological parameters out ot national income acconting data in the presence of bargaining in the labor market. Applying the method to US data, we obtain that the output elasticity with respect to capital exceed 0.5. -- Factor shares...

We use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard and holdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargaining power balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment, profits and rents....

This paper proposes a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity. In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, effort, and thus productivity, must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of effort. The...

In many countries wages are set by collective agreements. Such agreements tend to impose wage equality among the a⁄ected workers. We use a moral-hazard environment with two inferiority-averse workers who di⁄er in their productivities but are otherwise identical. In this setting, we analyze...

In many countries, wages are set by collective agreements, which tend to impose standard wages across workers in the same sector and job. We analyze the impact of imposing such standard wages on labor market outcomes. We set the labor relationship in a moral-hazard environment where two...