In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a...

We consider the learning curve in an industry with free entry and exit, and price-taking firms. A unique equilibrium exists if the fixed or entry cost is positive. While equilibrium profits are zero, mature firms earn rents on their learning, and no firm can profitably enter after the date the...

We investigate the incentives of a high-quality firm to transfer for free its proprietary product innovation technology to its standard-quality rival on which it has passive partial ownership holdings (PPOs). We identify the conditions under which there exists a non-controlling share to make...

We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. We show that the presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbent firms to establish a link. In particular, incumbent firms may choose to form an...

We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than...

We study a homogenous good triopoly in which firms first choose their cost-reducing R&D investments and consider alternative merger proposals, and then compete a la Cournot in the ensuing industry. We identify conditions under which both horizontal mergers and non-integration are sustained by...