Subsequent to the stricter corporate governance listing standards adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ in the early part of this century and the independence requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the number of investment bankers (IB) serving on corporate boards has declined...

In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between two audit committee characteristics - the composition (expertise and independence) and size of the audit committee - and the quality of financial reporting. We show that after controlling for firm size, board composition, a measure...

In this paper, we examine why firms have no debt in their capital structure. We reject the hypothesis that zero-leverage policies are driven by entrenched managers attempting to avoid the disciplinary pressures of debt. These firms do not have weaker internal or external governance mechanisms....

Stock splits enhance the marketability of mutual fund shares by restoring share prices to a preferred trading range. Mutual funds that split their shares experience significant increases in net assets and shareholders.

We examine the "marketability hypothesis," which states that stock splits enhance the attractiveness of shares to investors by restoring prices to a preferred trading range. We examine splits of mutual fund shares because they provide a clean testing ground for the marketability hypothesis,...

Although the choice of an IPO offer price level would seem to have little economic significance, firms do not decide this arbitrarily. Our findings suggest that firms select their IPO offer prices to target a desired ownership structure, which in turn has implications for underpricing and...

When firms go public in an IPO, they must choose a number of shares to offer and a price level for those shares. Given an estimated total value, this division would seem to have little economic significance. Casual empiricism and the evidence from stock splits, however, suggest that firms do not...

In this paper, we examine why firms have no debt in their capital structure. We reject the hypothesis that zero-leverage policies are driven by entrenched managers attempting to avoid the disciplinary pressures of debt. These firms do not have weaker internal or external governance mechanisms....