We examine the voluntary disclosure behavior of peer firms of hostile takeover targets. We find that peer firms under control threat use a disclosure strategy that emphasizes bad news: they provide more bad news forecasts, tend to bundle bad news forecasts with earnings announcements, use more...

Original Paper is available at: "https://ssrn.com/abstract=2610826" https://ssrn.com/abstract=2610826These internet appendices provide supplementary analyses and robustness tests for the paper “How does quasi-indexer ownership affect corporate tax planning?”

This paper investigates the conclusion in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) that dispersion in analysts' forecasts proxies for differences in investor beliefs, and that prices reflect the beliefs of optimistic investors when dispersion is high. If this is the case, we expect to find higher...

We investigate the impact of founding family ownership on accounting conservatism. Family ownership is characterized by large, under-diversified equity stake and long investment horizon. These features give family owners both the incentives and the ability to implement conservative financial...

Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run...

We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that, compared to non-family firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon,...

We construct a new, parsimonious, measure of disclosure quality – disaggregation quality (DQ) – and offer validation tests. DQ captures the level of disaggregation of accounting data through a count of non-missing Compustat line items, and reflects the extent of details in firms' annual...

We find evidence that performance — reflected in earnings and cash flows — is transferred from targets to acquirers around acquisitions. Using a sample of 2,128 completed deals from 1985-2010, our results suggest that targets depress performance when investor attention declines once the deal...