We study three alternative implementations of the Vickrey multi-unit demand auction: Vickrey's original static sealed-bid auction and two dynamic/Ausubel auctions, with and without public dropout information reported during the auction. Although implemented by a weaker solution concept, behavior...

A single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants. There are two types of monopolists, "weak" monopolists whose single-period best response is to acquiesce after entry, and "strong" monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight entry. Data show high...

Subjects update prior information simultaneously versus sequentially. The mean prediction is remarkably close to the correct Bayesian estimate with simultaneous information, but differs significantly conditional on whether good news precedes bad news or vice versa.

Bidding is studied in first-price common value auctions where an insider is better informed than other bidders (outsiders). As in symmetric information structure (SIS) auctions, inexperienced outsiders suffer from a strong winner's curse. Super-experienced bidders, who have largely overcome the...

Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the...