A theoretical model of sequential first-price auctions where bidders are risk-averse and values are affiliated is developed. For constant risk-aversion utility functions and a particular specification of affiliation, closed-form solutions for the symmetric equilibrium of a sequence of k...

In this paper, we investigate the problem of decentralizing public good decision-making from a political and informational perspective. First, we explain why different levels of jurisdiction, central decision-maker and local ones, are likely to take their decisions under different informational...

We study the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector focusing on adverse selection in productive efficiency. Each agent is assumed to have two type-dependent reservation utilities: the status quo utility in the public sector before downsizing and the utility that he expects to...

This paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups.