In a general auction framework with independent private values, we propose a game, with a simple economic interpretation, that allows to implement the revenue-maximizing auction outcome when the seller ignores the distributions of the different bidders’ valuations. In this detail-free...

In this paper we model the market for a homogeneous good and examine the role of information in determining market outcomes. Unlike in Baye and Morgan (2001) where consumers can only learn about the prices charged by different firms by subscribing to an information intermediary’s service, we...

This paper studies the role and implications of price advertising when shopping trips are costly to consumers. The authors present a model where consumers search sequentially and where stores advertise the price. Their model has a unique equilibrium exhibiting price dispersion. The model...

We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to...

Abstract This paper measures the effectiveness of market-based and cheap-talk information aggregation. Both information aggregation mechanisms (IAMs) are frequently used prior to IPOs and sales of Treasury bonds - it is largely acknowledged that they provide agents with useful information for...

This up-to-date and insightful book presents post-crisis scenarios for European regions with new methodologies and tools to support quantitative assessment and foresight. The aim is to develop regional forecasting methodologies and tools, appropriate to the regional-local scale but consistent...

This up-to-date and insightful book presents post-crisis scenarios for European regions with new methodologies and tools to support quantitative assessment and foresight. The aim is to develop regional forecasting methodologies and tools, appropriate to the regional-local scale but consistent...

We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer, depending on the realization of the privately observed valuations. The concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified...