Specific behavioral tendencies cause investors to deviate from optimal investing. We investigate three such tendencies in a simplified stock market. Subjects rarely follow the fully profit-maximizing strategy, most commonly by ignoring information and continuing to hold on to a stock regardless...

The existence of base rate fallacy (BRF) bias is explored employing: (i) a context treatment with a narrative story applied to asset markets and (ii) an isomorphic abstract setting using balls-and-bingo cages. Probability estimates reflect a BRF bias in both treatments, but is stronger with...

Experimental Markets were used to examine whether individual probability judgment biases affect market prices. This issue is important to accountants because users of accounting information (especially investors) face competitive market environments. The expectation was that it would be more...

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden-action trust game with pre-play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. While teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate...

Using a unique longitudinal dataset, we exploit within-patient variations in the timing of activation and subsequent use of the patient portal. Active portal use is motived by a significant uptick in office visits and phone encounters. This is followed by a drop back to pre-portal use, as portal...

The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information about players' intensity of preferences are compared to no communication controls. Pre-play communication significantly increases subjects' payoffs and the probability of coordination, while reducing...

Outcomes under the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model are investigated when proposers distribute benefits versus imposing costs under an experimental design where predicted outcomes are theoretically isomorphic, absent reference dependent preferences. Initial experimental sessions showed greater...

We study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins criteria. Teams have more proposer power, coming significantly closer to the very unequal payoffs...