We examine the role of cognitive ability, personality traits and gender in a one-shot gift exchange experiment. Controlling for cognitive ability and personality characteristics, men offer higher wages than women do, as do agents with greater cognitive ability and those scoring higher on...

We report the results of an experimental investigation of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power, close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily...

The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some...

For both two person teams and individuals unrestricted communication between opponents in a finitely repeated prisoner dilemma game results in stage-one cooperation rates of between 95-100%. Content analysis of between opponent communication focuses on the increased earnings cooperation can...

We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (1989a) bargaining model of legislative behavior comparing open versus closed amendment rules. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory as there are longer delays in distributing benefits and a more egalitarian distribution of benefits under the...