We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (1989a) bargaining model of legislative behavior comparing open versus closed amendment rules. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory as there are longer delays in distributing benefits and a more egalitarian distribution of benefits under the...

We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and...

Main description: Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value...

A minimum wage raises average wages along with modest increases in employees' average effort levels, generating a Pareto improvement in social welfare. The minimum wage reduces effort in the neighborhood of the minimum, but has no systematic effect on effort levels at higher wages. As a...

Determining the relationship between marihuana and economic activity is an important factor in establishing social policy in this area. The effects of marihuana availability and consumption on production, hours worked, and output per hour are reported from an experimental microeconomy involving...

We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the auction leads to efficient or...