We study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins criteria. Teams have more proposer power, coming significantly closer to the very unequal payoffs...

Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact on legislative bargaining of cuts versus increases in government spending. Using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic results in significant differences in bargaining outcomes:...

In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start out with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results reported in the social psychology literature. However, safety concerns quickly give way to teams cooperating significantly more than individuals....

Experiments have identified a number of well-known violations of expected utility theory, giving rise to alternative models of choice under uncertainty, all of which are able to explain these violations. In this article, predictions of several prominent rival formulations are examined. No single...

We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and...

The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information about players' intensity of preferences are compared to no communication controls. Pre-play communication significantly increases subjects' payoffs and the probability of coordination, while reducing...

Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the...