Much of the experimental evidence concerning violations of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory has been collected fr om experiments designed with conventional theory in mind and does not provide direct tests of alternative models such as regret theory and disappointment theory. This...

The paper presents a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the strategic structure of a game (the existential game) and the way the players describe the game to themselves. Each player works with a private description of the game in which strategies are identified by labels; labels...

Previous studies suggest that two otherwise robust ‘anomalies’ – preference reversals and disparities between buying and selling valuations – are eroded when respondents participate in repeated markets. We report an experiment which investigates whether this is true when factors...

We report an experimental test of level-k theory, applied to three simple games with non-neutral frames: Coordination, Discoordination and Hide and Seek. Using the same frame for all three games, we derive hypotheses that apply across the games and are independent of prior assumptions about...

This paper compares two alternative answers to the question, 'Who is the addressee of welfare economics?' These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of welfare economics, and have different implications for how welfare economics should be...

This is a new edition - with a substantial new introduction - of a book which has had a significant impact on economics, philosophy and political science. Robert Sugden shows how conventions of property, mutual aid, and voluntary supply of public goods can evolve spontaneously out of the...