Using a new, large data set on quarterly reserve requirements for the period 1970-2011, this paper provides new evidence on the use of reserve requirements as a countercyclical macroprudential tool in developing countries. The appeal of reserve requirements lies in the pro-cyclical behavior of...

The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle-blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a setting where bribe size is determined by Nash...

The welfare effect of an intra-industry trade liberalization between two different countries is studied in this paper. Firms are firstly assumed to behave à la Cournot, results are then generalized in a conjectural variation model. If trade liberalization increases "world"welfare, it is...

Strategic trade policy affects foreign-based furn's internationalization mode. In this paper, we endogenize market structure and tariff policy by considering a sequential game in which (i) a policy-maker maximizes national welfare, (ii) aforeign-based furn decides whether to supply the...

In a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, we introduce the concept of an intertemporal Cournot equilibrium. We show that if the number of strategic agents increases without limit, the intertemporal Cournot equilibrium converges to the intertemporal Walras equilibrium only when the tune...

International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts, they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper presents a model where a creditor, such as an...

In this paper we investigate, via an example, the effects of oligopolistic competition in a two countries two goods" Ricardian" model of international trade. By contrast with results that apply to the competitive free trade equilibrium, at the oligopoly equilibrium industries with different...

We analyze the principle of comparative advantage when agents in the world market are aware of the influence their individual supply exerts on the equilibrium exchange rate of goods. We show that specialization following comparative disadvantage can be an oligopoly equilibrium in a Ricardian...