This paper presents a mathematical model that analyzes the rational incentives involved in providing an informative evaluation for a knowledge management system when the evaluation has some consequences for the evaluator. The analysis is carried out in the context of the peer review process that...

We examine theoretically and experimentally how a society's grouping and stratification rules affect incentives and efficiency, and compare meritocratic and ascriptive grouping. We present a multi-level model of social production, and extend the usual single-group-level analysis of cooperation...

According to theory a pure meritocracy is efficient because individual members are competitively rewarded according to their individual contributions to society. However, purely individually based meritocracies seldom occur. We introduce a new model of social production called “team-based...

A new mechanism that substantially mitigates social dilemmas is examined theoretically and experimentally. It resembles the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) except that in each decision round subjects are ranked and then grouped according to their public contribution. The game has multiple...

Demand reduction in Uniform-price and English auctions are strategic reactions by participants to reduce price and thus increase potential profits. Laboratory experiments similar to the field experiments performed by List and Reiley (Am. Econ. Rev. 2000; <B>9</B>(4): 961-972) in which two individuals with...</b>

We examine theoretically and experimentally how competitive contribution-based group formation affects incentives to free-ride. We introduce a new formal model of social production, called a "Group-based Meritocracy Mechanism" (GBM), which extends the single-group-level analysis of a Voluntary...