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This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865861
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783453
This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite noncooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552231
This paper makes three related contributions to noncooperative game theory: (i) a solution concept (the “ICEU solution”), which is generated by an iterative procedure that constructs trinary partitions of strategy sets and deals with problems arising from weak dominance; (ii) a class of models...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552236
This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite noncooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571480
The game-theoretic assumption of 'common knowledge of rationality' leads to paradoxes when rationality is represented in a Bayesian framework as cautious expected utility maximisation with independent beliefs (ICEU). We diagnose and resolve these paradoxes by presenting a new class of formal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571493
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010932100
The game-theoretic assumption of common knowledge of rationality leads to paradoxes when rationality is represented in a Bayesian framework as cautious expected utility maximisation with independent beliefs (ICEU). We diagnose and resolve these paradoxes by presenting a new class of formal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277492
This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite noncooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531438
This paper makes three related contributions to noncooperative game theory: (i) a solution concept (the “ICEU solution”), which is generated by an iterative procedure that constructs trinary partitions of strategy sets and deals with problems arising from weak dominance; (ii) a class of models...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453719