This paper analyses a general-equilibrium model of the complementarity between economic competition for the allegiance of subjects and military competition for the control of land. In our model economic competition between rival rulers for the allegiance of subjects results in their subjects,...

In many countries, especially poor countries, a heavy burden of taxes, fees, bureaucratic hassles, and bribes drives many producers into an informal sector. This paper shows that we can attribute the existence of a large informal sector to the fact that, because productive endowments contain...

In many historical cases victory by a challenger for political dominance over an initially dominant group has ended civil conflict. But, in other places victory by a challenger has provided only a temporary respite, a brief intermission before the resumption of civil conflict. This paper uses a...

This paper explores the conditions under which a moral disposition is rewarded, in the sense of moral people being more prosperous than amoral people. The analytical framework is a general equilibrium model in which production is more lucrative for moral people than for amoral people, but in...

This paper analyzes a general-equilibrium model in which each person can choose to be either a producer or a predator. This model shows how predation breaks the link between the interpersonal distribution of productive resources and the interpersonal distribution of consumption. Specifically, we...

This paper analyses a general-equilibrium model of the complementarity between economic competition for the allegiance of subjects and military competition for the control of land. In our model economic competition between rival rulers for the allegiance of subjects results in their subjects,...