In this paper we examine the discrepancy between theoretical predictions of unstable majorities and observed stability. Minimum winning coalitions divide program benefits among their members, creating incentives for those left out to entice defection by offering rewards to those who leave and...

Is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively whereas others are not? The transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis. This approach views international cooperation...

The purpose of this paper is to summarize some of the bargaining issues involved in collective action to address local common-pool problems and to illustrate them in three empirical cases. The importance of timing or the sequence of coalition building and the heterogeneity of the participant's...

We show that grandfathering fishing rights to local users or recognizing first possessions is more dynamically efficient than auctions of such rights. It is often argued that auctions allocate rights to the highest-valued users and thereby maximize resource rents. We counter that rents are not...