We present a theory of capital investment and debt and equity financing in a real-options model of a public corporation. The model assumes that managers maximize the present value of their future compensation (managerial rents), subject to constraints imposed by outside shareholders' property...

We present a real-options model of takeovers and disinvestment in declining industries. As product demand declines, a first-best closure level is reached, where overall value is maximized by shutting down the firm and releasing its capital to investors. Absent takeovers, managers of unlevered...

process, incorporating moral hazard and asymmetric information problems. The structure of the model, involving managerial effort, staged investment, and later-stage syndication, replicates what we know empirically of venture-capital financing. An entrepreneur raises funding for a positive NPV...

This paper describes corporate investment and financing decisions when managers have inside information about the value of the firm's existing investment and growth opportunities, but cannot convey that information to investors. Capital markets are otherwise perfect and efficient. In these...

This paper tests traditional capital structure models against the alternative of a pecking order model of corporate financing. The basic pecking order model, which predicts external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater explanatory power than a static...

Among the interesting changes in the U.S. economy in recent years have been the substantial changes in the age distribution of income and its components. These changes are interesting in and of themselves, but also are an important background against which to interpret aggregate economic...

Financial Puzzles written by Stewart Myers of MIT will be published over the next several issues of JAF. These are offered to stimulate discussion and thought around several topics in finance. The proposed solutions to the puzzles will be published in the following issue of JAF, as well as in...

This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal with moral hazard, effort provision, asymmetric information and hold-up problems. We explore several financing scenarios, including first-best, monopolistic, syndicated and fully competitive financing. We...

This paper develops a signaling model in which accounting information improves real investment decisions. Pure cash flow reporting is shown to lead to underinvestment when managers have superior information but are acting in shareholders' interests. Accounting by prespecified,...

This paper contrasts the quot;static tradeoffquot; and quot;pecking orderquot; theories of capital structure choice by corporations. In the static tradeoff theory, optimal capital structure is reached when the tax advantage to borrowing is balanced, at the margin, by costs of financial distress....