The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to include a clawback or holdback clause in executive compensation contracts. Using an experiment, we examine how executives react to the enforcement of these clauses after a restatement. We find that executives generally reduced the riskiness of their financial...

We examine whether financial reporting quality improves after firms voluntarily adopt a compensation clawback provision. Clawback provisions allow companies to recoup excess incentive pay in the event of an accounting restatement, and are intended to ex ante deter managers from publishing...

We present 60 experienced credit analysts with financial information for two firms: one that mainly outsources production and one that does not. We find that analysts are better able to identify firm characteristics that make an outsourcer more creditworthy when those characteristics are...

We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is impaired...