We study competition in capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading. Perfect competition is impeded by entrepreneurs' threat to borrow excessively from multiple lenders and to shirk. As a consequence, investors earn positive rents at equilibrium. We then...

We focus on structural models in corporate finance with roll-over debt structures in the vein of Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996). We show that these models incorrectly assume that the optimal default is defined by the first time such that the firm's assets reaches a sufficiently low...

We study the decision of when to invest in an indivisible project whose value is perfectly observable but driven by a parameter that is unknown to the decision maker ex ante. This problem is equivalent to an optimal stopping problem for a bivariate Markov process. Using filtering and martingale...

We report results of a series of experiments that simulates trading in financial market. The specific format of our experiment allows to unambiguously measure the information content of the order flow and to disentangle the impact that risk attitudes and belief updating rules have on market...

We study the decision of when to invest in an indivisible project whose value is perfectly observable but driven by a parameter that is unknown to the decision maker ex ante. This problem is equivalent to an optimal stopping problem for a bivariate Markov process. Using filtering and martingale...