This paper reviews the main theoretical and practical arguments in favor and against governments’ policies supporting Free/Open Source (F/OS) software. Using the information gathered from the OSOR.eu website, we build an original dataset about F/OS software interventions across Europe and we...

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to...

Despite a general trend of lower charges for mobile calls, in Europe prices for international roaming calls have remained at levels surprisingly high. The apparent reluctance of mobile network operators to lower roaming tariffs is generating many antitrust concerns. This paper presents in a two...

We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible network goods in a two-stage game played by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under different assumptions about the nature of the...

During the last few decades, the number of patents in information and communication technologies has increased considerably. An increasing number of patents and the associated fragmentation of IP rights have generated a series of potentially problematic consequences. Patent thickets, royalty...

users to satisfy their specific needs; the more a software evolves towards a stable release able to address the requirements of its developers, the more successful the project. In this paper we use a large data-set obtained from SourceForge.net to estimate the impact of observed project...

Residential electricity markets in European countries are still characterized by low consumer engagement, especially where regulated and liberalized markets coexist. Using an original dataset on 2015-2018 prices for the Italian electricity market, augmented with the number of residential...

We model a three-stage duopolistic game where firms first simultaneously choose the technological direction of their innovation, then invest in the chosen direction, and finally, compete. Investments can be in competing or non-competing innovations and their outcome is uncertain. If successful,...