We prove that every two-player non zero-sum deterministic stopping game with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an e-equilibrium, for every e0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite...

We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus....

We study a model in which each of finitely many agent cares about a given subset of finitely many goods. We provide minimal conditions that ensure the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price vector - a price vector for which supply meets demand. Copyright Springer-Verlag...

We study stopping games in the setup of Neveu. We prove the existence of a uniform value (in a sense defined below), by allowing the players to use randomized strategies. In contrast with previous work, we make no comparison assumption on the payoff processes. Moreover, we prove that the value...