We study an optimal weak collusion-proof auction in an environment where a subset (or subsets) of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited...

This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions...

We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to...

This study examines the effect of users' prior experience on the adoption behaviour in the Internet protocol television (IP TV) service domains. This article proposes a new acceptance model for an IP TV service considering the moderating effect of experience and verifies the model with an...

Although research interest in post adoption behavior of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) users increases from year to year, few studies examine how motivational factors and service type influence post adoption behavior. This study investigates the antecedents of post adoption...

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment,...

A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence...