This thesis includes three essays on monetary theory analyzing monetized trading arrangements in three separate environments: (1) transient economy, (2) economy with two competing imperfect record-keeping technologies, and (3) economy where agents are subject to productivity shocks. In Essay...

In a random-matching monetary economy, efficient and inefficient sellers choose between home or market production. Since inefficient sellers bargain up their prices, two equilibria may exist – with high or low market participation – depending on extent of heterogeneity and frictions. In...

This paper shows that fiat money can be feasible and essential even if the trading horizon is finite and deterministic. The result hinges on two features of our model. First, individual actions can affect the future availability of productive resources. So, agents may be willing to sell for...

In a random-matching monetary economy, efficient and inefficient sellers choose between home or market production. Since inefficient sellers bargain up their prices, two equilibria may exist-with high or low market participation-depending on extent of heterogeneity and frictions. In equilibrium,...

When the repeated prisoner's dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral breakup, maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) alternation on the equilibrium path, we describe...