This paper presents an experimental investigation of the three ambient-based mechanisms proposed by Segerson [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 87-98 (1988)] for controlling emissions from a group of nonpoint source polluters: a marginal tax/subsidy, a fixed penalty, and a mechanism that...

This article considers whether communication can improve the efficacy of incentive mechanisms designed to correct the problem of moral hazard in groups. In particular, we use experimental economics methods to study environmental targeting instruments proposed by Segerson (1988) for regulating a...

In this paper we build on a voluntary mechanism introduced by Segerson and Wu (2006) that uses the threat of an ambient tax to induce nonpoint source polluters to reduce emissions. In addition to reviewing Segerson and Wu's policy, we propose a new voluntary/threat policy that offers some...

Recent papers show that in group decisions individuals have social preferences for efficiency and equity. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods, has not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates whether voting decisions...