The provision of liquidity by international institutions such as the IMF to countries experiencing balance of payment problems could prevent liquidity runs but could also cause moral hazard distortions: expecting to be bailed out by the IMF, debtor countries would have weak incentives to...

During recent episodes of financial turmoil some policy makers voiced concerns about aggressive, and possibly manipulative, practices by highly leveraged institutions in emerging markets. This paper addresses these concerns by reconsidering in detail, at both theoretical and empirical levels,...

This paper analyzes optimal spending, tax and financial policies in models of endogenous growth where public spending is productive. We extend previous work in four directions. First, we analyze optimal policies when the government is allowed to borrow and lend, rather than being restricted to...

In this paper we reconsider the trade-off between rules and discretion in fiscal policy in the presence of politically motivated fiscal deficits. We present a model of political bias in the budget process appropriately developed to allow for tax-smoothing-motivated deficits as well as for the...

This paper develops an interpretation of the Asian meltdown focused on moral hazard as the common source of overinvestment, excessive external borrowing, and current account deficits. To the extent that foreign creditors are willing to lend to domestic agents against future bail-out revenue from...