We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border mergers in industries with a vertical structure. Absent free trade, in a vertically related industry, the downstream firms will not choose the social optimum under spatial price discrimination...

Lucas [Lucas, Robert, E., Jr. (1976), "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique", Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1, pp 19-46] had argued that interventionist macroeconomics policies may fail because policies themselves affect the optimal behaviour of private agents and...

We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical merger with a monopoly upstream will induce each downstream firm (inside and out of the merger) to deviate from the socially optimal location.

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal-informal production organization for the same...