This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the Schwartz (1997) model which makes predictions about audit quality, investments, and social welfare. The setting we investigate is a two-person strategic auditing game in which auditor-subjects select a level of audit quality...

This paper provides results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory rotation or retention of auditors may affect auditor reporting. Repeat audit engagements are believed to be a source of economic rents to auditors, and as such they are believed to pose a threat to auditor...

This paper investigates the settlement and litigation incentives of auditors under two legal regimes: the joint and several regime and the several only regime. The model's predictions are that if all defendants have full solvency, then auditors have lower expected liabilities under the joint and...

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate the social welfare implications of two liability rules (negligence and strict liability) and two damage measures (out-of-pocket and independent-of-investment damages). We focus on information production strategies (i.e., the...