We report a gift exchange experiment. Firms make wage offers; workers respond by determining an effort level. Higher effort is more costly to workers, and firms have no mechanism for punishing or rewarding workers. Consistent with the gift exchange hypothesis, workers provide more effort at...

This dissertation comprises two essays on earnings forecasting accuracy. Chapter 2 focuses on how management forecasting accuracy is affected by managers behavioral biases over time and Chapter 3 addresses how analyst portfolio design choices affect cross-sectional differences in analyst...

This dissertation examines two research questions that contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting information in supply chain relationships. The first research question examines whether nonfinancial performance measures are leading indicators of supply chain financial performance...

The corporate governance literature generally assumes that shareholders incentives to monitor management depend on how much of the firm the shareholders own. This dissertation proposes that another determinant of monitoring incentive is how long large shareholders intend to hold their shares,...

This study addresses the relation between the exit of venture capital and opportunistic behavior in financial disclosure. Specifically, I examine whether the exit of venture capital is associated with income-increasing earnings management in the IPO year and financial statement restatements...

In this dissertation, I conduct experimental labor markets to investigate the effectiveness of an optimal agency contract in inducing employee effort and maximizing firm profit. I compare firm profit under the optimal agency contract to that under a theoretically sub-optimal contract that relies...