This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a differentiated goods duopoly with either price- or quantity-setting firms, where firms invest in environmental R&D that reduces emissions. It is shown that in quantity (Cournot) competition, the emission tax is always lower than marginal...

This paper considers a model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Firms spending on R&D may improve the quality of their product. K&D cooperation in the fort11 of a RJV among a subset of innovating firms introduces the possibility of a much better product being produced relative...

In recent years there has been an increasing trend in various forms of collaboration and technology transfer between industry and universities, such as licensing, spin-offs and research joint ventures. In this paper, I provide an explanation for the choice of licensing versus research joint...

In the presence of output subsidization, the optimal output subsidy is identical and profits, output and social welfare are also identical irrespective of whether (i)a public firm moves simultaneously with n private firms or (ii) it acts as a Stackelberg leader or (iii) all firms, public and...

We examine the role that product differentiation can play in the design of environmental policy under full commitment and no commitment on the part of the environmental regulator. We consider a setting with two firms selling a differentiated product which generates pollution through emissions....

We present a model of spatial price discrimination where R&D spillovers are endogenous as they depend on firms' location. We establish that both the distance between locations and R&D efforts are an increasing function of the transportation cost coefficient and show that there is a continuum of...