This paper performs a comparison of two well known approaches for modelling R&D spillovers associated with investment in E-R&D, namely dAspremont-Jacquemin and Kamien-Muller-Zang. We show that there is little qualitative difference between the models in terms of total surplus delivered when...

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D...

We investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross-hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, it is possible for governments to impose HTBTs, so long as firms apply different...

We address the following question: how does a higher education funding system influence the trade-off that universities make between research and teaching? We do so by constructing a model that allows universities to choose actively the quality of their teaching and research when faced with...

We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger, there is a probability...

We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger, there is a probability...

We examine the use of subsidies to R&D in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production, however, it...

We present a model of spatial price discrimination where R&D spillovers are endogenous as they depend on firms' location. We establish that both the distance between locations and R&D efforts are increasing functions of the transportation cost coefficient and show that there is a continuum of...

We present a three-stage game where two firms choose location, R&D and price, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on firms' location. That is, the closer firms are to each other, the greater the benefit they receive from their rivals' efforts in quality-enhancing R&D. We show that...