We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterize optimal separating joint liability contracts...

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in <link rid="b4">Ghatak (2000)</link> violate an "ex post" incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability...

This paper examines a randomized intervention in Delhi, India, that provided unconditional cash transfer to a group of households as a replacement for food security by means of a below poverty line card. A special feature of our study is that our experiment allows to differentiate between...

This paper originates from the current move to individual-based lending systems by many microfinance institutions and the fear that this move will lead to a decrease in access to credit for the poor. More specifically, the paper examines how an individual-based lending scheme can be devised such...