We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents...

We argue that the rise of antidumping protection and the proliferation of voluntary export restraints are fundamentally inter-related. We show that both can be explained by a cost-based definition of dumping when the domestic government has incomplete information about the foreign firm's costs....

Competition policy emerged as an important area of interest during the later stages of Uruguay Round negotiations. The task of establishing competition policy is complicated by the fact that there already are trade statutes - antidumping, countervailing duty, safeguard actions - that relate to...

We study the determinants of trade policy decisions focusing specifically on antidumping and countervailing duty statutes administered by the International Trade Commission (ITC). Using detailed industry, import, and political pressure data we model ITC decision making, weighing the relative...

We examine the incentives for a government to levy an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist. With complete information, the home government uses tariffs to extract rents and therefore implements a policy of discriminatory tariffs entailing higher tariffs on more efficient firms. By contrast if...