This paper studies how moral feelings (hostility or altruism) modify incentive contractsin the Holmström and Milgrom (1990) multi-agent moral hazard model. One agentfeels altruism or hostility towards the other. His objective function is assumed to be aweighted sum of the two certain...

This paper considers a competitive insurance market under moral hazard and adverseselection, in which both the agent’s preventive effort and self protection costs are unobservableby the insurance companies. We show that the results of the adverse selection model(Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976))...

We study horizontal partial acquisitions in an oligopolistic industry in the absence of synergies.Contrary to existing results, we …nd that a dominant shareholder may choose to acquire sharesin a competitor although the aggregate pro…t of the group of …rms under his control, and eventhe...