We study the effect of bank governance on risk-taking in commercial lending. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers. This effect is restricted to periods of distress in the banking industry. Banks with more effective boards are less likely to lend to...

Recent surveys indicate that industry expertise is the most sought-after director qualification. Yet evidence on the value of such expertise is limited. This paper shows that firms that are difficult for non-experts to monitor and advise are more likely to appoint industry expert directors. Such...

We conceptualize mergers as one of several strategies for creating value and study merger performance by evaluating the performance of firms employing an acquisitive strategy. Relative to other firms, acquisitive firms are valued lower, innovate less, and exhibit lower employee and total factor...

Collaborative partnerships create interfirm linkages that potentially tie the fortunes of partnering firms to changing circumstances and decisions of each other. Yet not much is known about how firms in such partnerships are affected by their partners' post-formation decisions outside of...

As shown in previous studies, founder-led firms perform better than those run by professional managers. Does this reflect the special relation of founders to their firms or do entrepreneurs possess attributes and experiences that are valuable even at firms not founded by them? Drawing on the...

A significant and growing percentage of U.S. firms now have boards where the CEO is the only employee director (i.e., fully independent boards). This paper studies whether and how this practice impacts board effectiveness. I find that fully independent boards are associated with a significant...

Labor has a large contractual claim on a firm's cash flow. Labor equity ownership gives employees both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to otherwise similar firms, labor-controlled publicly traded firms invest less, take fewer...

This paper presents evidence on how directors who are active CEOs of other firms affect firm behavior and board effectiveness. I show that shareholders incur significant costs when other CEOs serve on the board. CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance....

We study the effect of labor-friendly corporate practices on shareholder outcomes using firms selected by Fortune magazine as the quot;Best 100 Companies to Work for in Americaquot; over 1998-2004. We find that investors react positively to the list's announcement and that list firms...

This paper examines the relation between a board's size and its monitoring effectiveness by exploring how board size affects different aspects of the CEO replacement process. I find that the probability of CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to board size, and that the abnormal...