This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modi-fied version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japaneseflower markets, there is an additional stage, called 'mari', where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers at...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modi-fied version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japaneseflower markets, there is an additional stage, called “mari”, where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers...

This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a “piecewise affine transformation” of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...

We consider a stable improvement problem in a controlled school choice model which covers those of several previous studies. First, we consider the case where the priority for each school is a weak order. We derive a sufficient condition for a stable matching to be constrained efficient. It is...

We construct a new method to describe firm distributions within technology fields and investigate the relationship between those distributions and aggregate innovation. To locate firms in a technology space, we apply multidimensional scaling for inter-firm technological dissimilarity, computed...