An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...

A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand parameter of a specific repeat buyer is investigated. The buyer may strategically reject the seller's first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a...

We study a dynamic model of fraud and trust-building featuring two parties: a principal, who has limited power of commitment and who wishes to accept real projects and reject fake ones, and an agent, who is either an ethical type that produces only a real project, or a strategic type that...

At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, consumers stockpiled common household items in expectation of shortages and rising prices. In this paper, we explore the interaction of consumer stockpiling with monopoly pricing in the face of a supply disruption. If consumers can store the good, they...

When a firm can recognize its previous customers, it may use information about their past purchases to price discriminate. We study a model with a monopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, where consumers have the ability to maintain their anonymity and avoid being identified as...

The common marketing practice of offering subscribers enticements to switch suppliers is explored. It is shown that this type of price discrimination is the natural mode of competition in subscription markets such as long distance telephony and banking and that it prevails even when the industry...