We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (e.g., the IMF) and a country has for optimal (conditional) reform design. The main result is that the informational advantage of the country must be strictly greater than the advantage of the multilateral in order...

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

In this paper we suggest that the dual role played by the IMF, as a creditor and as a monitor of economic reforms, might explain the lack of credibility of the Fund threat of sanctioning non-compliance with conditionality. Specifically, we show that the IMF desire to preserve its reputation as a...

Prolonged use of Fund resources has consistently expanded since the 1970s among both lowincome and middle-income countries. Overall this phenomenon suggests a lack of effectiveness of Fund supported programs. Such conditionality failure has been explained by the literature by looking both at the...

The combination of special interest politics (agency problems) and informational asymmetries presents serious problems as the implementation of conditionality is concerned. In this paper we focus on the role that the transmission of information between the IMF and the borrowing government has...

This paper focuses on the problem of information transmission between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with communication modeled as cheap talk. I posit that the Fund and the Bank have strategically relevant and diverse expertise whose proper combination might provide a richer...