We report the results of experiments designed to test recent theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, the upstream firm has more difficulty commiting to supply the monopoly quantity in treatments with non-integration and secret contracts than in either treatments with...

We report the results of experiments designed to test recent theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, vertical integration improves the upstream firm's ability to commit to restricting output to the monopoly level, as does the use of public contracts. Public contracts are...

When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstream firms, it may fail to monopolize the market because of opportunistic behavior towards the downstream firms. We analyze this well-known commitment problem in an experiment where we extend previous research by allowing for...

When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstreamfirms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the...

When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstreamfirms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the...

When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstream firms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the...