Showing 1 - 10 of 488
We use a principal-agent framework to reexamine the implications of the negligence and strict liability rules when the tortfeasor is an agency. (...)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005841059
We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agencyproblems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agents effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005841061
This paper analyzes the trade-o! between monitoring and incentives in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. We derive general results on the optimalmonitoring - incentives mix for the case where both parties are risk-neutral and the agentfaces a limited liability constraint. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005841062
This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when evidence about injurers' behavior is imperfect and rests with the parties. We show that the `preponderance of evidence' standard used in common law, together with ordinary exclusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844236
We consider the effects on reward systems of workers concern withrelative pay by comparing the wage costs of providing incentives through groupversus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, eitherscheme may be the least cost one depending on the workers outside...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844237
We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844239
This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when evidence is imperfect and rests with the parties. We show that the "preponderance of evidence' standard provides maximal incentives to exert care. This holds even though litigants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315376
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000679948
We argue that the common-law standard of proof, given the rulesof evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued inthe legal literature, but may well be e±cient from the standpointof providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior.By contrast, civil law's higher but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005857933
We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858009