This paper develops a model that jointly explains excess demand for performance events and the presence of anti-scalping laws. The explanation is based on the fact that the buyers of tickets are also an important input into the performance experience. The use of line-ups as a screening mechanism...

In this paper we argue that, by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game, one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts. This point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once-for-all bargain...

This paper explores how bargaining frictions and bargaining procedures interact to determine players' bargaining costs in multiple-issue bargaining settings. When bargaining frictions take the form of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached, issue-by-issue negotiation can...

This paper develops a model that explains the persistence of excess demand for some goods. It offers that, for some goods, consumers care about who else is consuming the good. As such, their willingness to pay depends on their beliefs about the other consumers. We demonstrate that screening...