In this paper we combine AcemogluÂ’s model of the economic origins of democracy with LohmannÂ’s model of political massprotest. This alllows us to provide ananalysis of the economic causes of political regimec hange based on the micro foundations of rebellion. We are able tod erive...

We develop a dynamic model of the exploitation of an environmental resource with endogenous property rights. We are able to explain both the evolution of property rights and environmental quality. In some circumstances the time path of environmental quality is U-shaped and resembles an...

type="main" <p>A model where a dictator decides on both the level of public-sector capital and whether to democratize is constructed. Under dictatorship the labour market is monopsonistic; democratization involves instituting a competitive labour market. Workers sometimes have a credible threat of...</p>

Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low...

We develop and test a simple asymmetric information model of CEO quality, in which CEOs know their quality and shareholders may only infer this from observations of corporate profits. CEOs signal their quality to shareholders by manipulating the time path of corporate profits. Though...

This article describes the sale and optimal regulation of a sequence of public utilities, where monitoring of regulatory compliance is costly. The government is concerned with the revenue raised by successive privatizations as well as the standard objective of efficiency in production. The costs...