An analysis of the effects of right-to-carry laws on crime requires particular distributional and structural considerations. First, due to the count nature of crime data and the low number of expected instances per observation in the most appropriate data, last-squares methods yield unreliable...

Analyzing county level data for the entire United States from 1977 to 2000, we find annual reductions in murder rates between 1.5 and 2.3 percent for each additional year that a right-to-carry law is in effect. For the first five years that such a law is in effect, the total benefit from reduced...

We describe a simple algorithm that permits the sequential (period-by-period) solution of large-scale dynamic CGE models with agents who have perfect foresight over an infinite number of periods. The algorithm requires neither any assumptions about behavior in a ?final? period nor that the base...

When urban renewal projects require that smaller parcels be assembled into a single large one, owners who hold out for higher prices may either prevent or significantly delay socially efficient redevelopment. Local governments seeking private redevelopment currently have only the choice between...

The efficiency of mechanisms to control CO2 emissions is limited by disagreement about the harm from these emissions. Thus existing emission control mechanisms require negotiated compromise regarding either the efficient price or the level of emissions to be tolerated. As an alternative to...

A decomposition of aggregate labor productivity based on internationally comparable data reveals that a high share of employment and low labor productivity in agriculture are mainly responsible for low aggregate productivity in poor countries. Using a two-sector general-equilibrium model, we...

We describe a mechanism for government taking under uncertainty that provides incentives for governments to make efficient taking decisions and for property owners to use their properties efficiently. We argue that efficiency in takings requires that governments not only pay the value of...

The efficiency of mechanisms to control activities with negative externalities is limited by uncertainty about the social costs of these activities. Existing regulatory mechanisms require negotiated compromise about either the prices of activities or the levels to be tolerated. We offer a...