This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices are a function of the composition of the legislature and of the executive. In an institutional setup in which the policy outcome depends upon relative plurality, each voter has incentives to be...

A model of the two-way relationship between elections and the economy, previously estimated on historical data for 1916-1988, is applied to the United States elections of 1992, 1994, and 1996. The 1992 result was a surprise to the model since the economy had performed reasonably well that...

We develop and test a model of joint determination of the rate of economic growth and the results of presidential and Congressional elections in the United States. In our model, economic agents and voters have rational expectations. Economic policy varies as a function of control of the White...

The 1951 elections for the French National Assembly permitted the formation of distinct formalized coalitions in each of 95 multimember districts. The resulting coalition outcomes are analyzed via a behavioral model that emphasizes real-time constraints that are largely ignored by formal game...