Formation of coalitions in oligopolies is modeled as a noncooperative game in which firms' strategies have a binary form (to cooperate or not). The author demonstrates a one-to-one correspondence between stable cartels defined by C. d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and the Nash equilibria of this game....

We investigate experimentally whether "binding agreements" can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known theoretical...

We investigate whether "binding agreements" can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players to free ride on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known theoretical result is that the...

We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitration) with a new arbitration scheme, non compulsory, we proposed in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008)): ROC (Recursive Offer Conciliation). The two mechanisms are also compared with a...