Showing 201 - 208 of 208
We formulate and analyze a model of team structure and monitoring within a LEN agency framework. We incorporate three key instruments in the internal design of an organization involving team production: team size, monitoring activities, and incentive contracts. We show that the complex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012709506
Managerial bonus payments are frequently determined by both objective and subjective indicators of managerial performance. By its very nature, subjective information is not verifiable for contracting purposes. The inclusion of such information in managerial bonus schemes therefore requires a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770317
The reported cost of a product frequently contains historical cost components that reflect past investments in productive capacity. We examine a setting wherein a firm makes a sequence of overlapping capacity investments. Earlier research has identified particular accrual accounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720319
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477037
"Accounting influences our lives. Whether or not one uses accounting information, accounting alters our social, economic and physical environment. And of course, it impacts organisations and altering what we do and the decisions we make. Corporate action regarding new product developments,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013462559
We analyze optimal correlation levels in information technologies when multiple signals are available as contracting mechanisms within the principal-agent paradigm. We identify sufficient conditions ensuring that uniformly lower-correlation functions (in action levels) are preferred, as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089513
"This book focuses on how cost accounting helps managers make better decisions, as cost account-ants increasingly are becoming integral members of their company's decision-making teams. In order to emphasize this prominence in decision making, we use the "different costs for different purposes"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012193493
The corporate governance literature generally assumes that shareholders incentives to monitor management depend on how much of the firm the shareholders own. This dissertation proposes that another determinant of monitoring incentive is how long large shareholders intend to hold their shares,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009428958