Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedge-fund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds? This would be particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds' returns. In...

Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedgefund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds? This would be particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds’ returns. In...

The behavior of a hedge-fund manager naturally depends on her compensation scheme, her preferences, and constraints on her risk-taking. We propose a numerical method which can be used to analyze the impact of these influences. The model leads to several interesting and novel results concerning...

We examine the use of second-order stochastic dominance as both a way to measure performance and also as a technique for constructing portfolios. Using in-sample data, we construct portfolios such that their second-order stochastic dominance over a typical pension fund benchmark is most...

Constructing portfolios based on second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) is theoretically attractive since all risk-averse investors would prefer a dominating portfolio. However, choosing among SSD efficient portfolios is a challenge without an obvious ranking metric. We explore a particular...

Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedgefund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds? This would be particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds’ returns. In...

We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge-fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, she displays risk-taking that varies dramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find her risk-taking is rapidly moderated...

We model a firm’s value process controlled by a manager maximizing expected utility from restricted shares and employee stock options. The manager also dynamically controls allocation of his outside wealth. We explore interactions between those controls as he partially hedges his exposure to...

We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, the manager displays risk taking that varies dramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find that the manager's risk...